Kate Barker's picture
Affiliation: 
British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme
Credentials: 
former member of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee

Voting history

Deal or no deal: The Greece standoff

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Question 1:  

Do you agree that, on balance, the implementation of the agreement as outlined in media reports will have a non-trivial negative effect on Greek GDP?

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Answer:
Agree
Confidence level:
Confident

Monetary policy and the zero lower bound (ZLB)

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Question 2: Do you agree that the benefits of reforming the monetary system to allow materially negative policy interest rates outweigh the possible costs?

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Answer:
Strongly Disagree
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
i find it hard to think that there are not alternative policies, possibly including fiscal, which would be preferable. There is of course a question raised implicitly here about whether the inflation target is too low.

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Question 1: Do you agree that it is feasible for the UK authorities to change the monetary system so that materially negative policy interest rates could be safely implemented? (In answering, you may wish to explain your reasons and define your view of 'material')

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Answer:
Disagree
Confidence level:
Confident
Comment:
Feasible in theory. But in practice think this would be rejected by the population.

Transparency and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy following the Warsh Review at the Bank of England

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Question 2: Do you agree that the Bank's proposal to release the policy decision, MPC minutes and (once a quarter) the Inflation Report all at the same time justifies a change in the structure of MPC meetings from two consecutive days to a process in which in the MPC meetings are spread out over seven days?
 
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Answer:
Agree
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
Could not alter the publication schedule without this change. And previously there was sometimes less time than I would have liked to reflect on the Wednesday discussion before voting.
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Question 1: Do you agree that the simultaneous release of the policy decision, the enhanced minutes (including the voting record) of the MPC meeting and (in the relevant months) the release of the Inflation Report will facilitate inference on the likely stance of monetary policy?
 
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Answer:
Strongly Agree
Confidence level:
Extremely confident
Comment:
Past practice often led to the markets interpreting the I Report one way and the minutes a different way. This will now be avoided. However, having these documents out at the same time as the vote is rather ambitious. i don't think putting them into the following week would have mattered.

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