
The trans-Atlantic interest rate divergence
Ethan Ilzetzki and Marta Grzana
Thursday, March 20, 2025
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Summary
A majority of the CfM-CEPR panel attributes the divergence of US and EU interest rates to the long-term differences in growth expectations and the natural rate of interest. Around a third of the panel attributes the gap to diverging inflation expectations and fiscal policies.
Background
The March 2025 CfM-CEPR survey asked the panel for the causes of the interest rate divergence between the US and Europe.
Interest rate divergence
Interest rates have diverged between the US and Europe over the past decade (Figure 1). In contrast, interest rates in the US and UK have moved more or less lock-step. Why have Eurozone interest rates diverged from the US? And why have UK rates not? European interest rates increased in recent days, following the German announcement on increased defense and infrastructure spending, but a gap of over a percentage point remains. There are several potential explanations for the recent interest rate divergence between the US and the UK, on one hand, and the Eurozone, on the other.
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Figure 1: 10-year interest rates in Germany and the US
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the OECD, from fred.stlouisfed.org, Feb 16, 2025
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Historically, trans-Atlantic monetary policy divergence was driven by differences in economic activity, prompting differences in monetary policy stance (2004 and 2016). Since 2022, ECB rates have risen less rapidly than US rates, with a gap of more than 1 percentage point in the two regions’ monetary policy rates (Figure 2). In contrast, the Bank of England has stayed in lock-step with the Federal Reserve in its monetary policy rates (Giles, 2024). Furthermore, the ECB began loosening monetary policy earlier than its Anglophone counterparts. These may reflect differences in views on inflationary pressures. In addition, the US economy is less sensitive to higher interest rates than other economies, requiring the central bank to raise rates more aggressively in face of inflationary pressures (Wilding & Balls, 2024).
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Figure 2: Monetary policy interest rates of the Bank of England, ECB, and Federal Reserve
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​Source: S&P Capital IQ data, 26th February 2025​
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The divergence in monetary policy stances may reflect differences in underlying economic conditions. Since the pandemic, GDP growth has been higher in the US than in the UK and the Eurozone: in January, the German economic growth forecast was downgraded to 0.3% from October’s 1.1% estimate (Armstrong, 2025). This comes from a larger fiscal stimulus in the US, making inflation in the US more demand-driven than on the other side of the Atlantic. The US economy has also benefited more from the boom in technology companies at the forefront of the AI revolution. The Eurozone economy also has weak momentum, especially in manufacturing, combined with low consumer confidence, and gas prices that remain at a high level compared to the US: five times higher, relative to twice as high before the pandemic (Gourinchas, 2025).
A different view is that the interest rate divergence reflects differences in long term economic circumstances, and the subsequent difference in natural rates. The ECB has estimated that the Eurozone neutral rate is between 1.75 and 2.25% (Koranyi & Richardson, 2025), while the Fed estimates the US neutral rate to be at 2.9%. Vanguard has estimated that the US neutral rate has improved due to better growth prospects (Aliaga-Díaz, 2024). A higher US rate reflects persistent stronger productivity growth, especially in the technology sector, supported by deeper capital markets and a more favorable business environment. In the long-term, this structural advantage contributes to higher returns on US investments and increased capital flows which translate into a stronger US dollar (Gourinchas, 2025). On the other hand, the Eurozone natural rate of interest is driven down by demographic factors, such as the aging population resulting in slower labour force growth (IMF, 2023). Moreover, according to Citibank, in the third quarter of 2024, non-residential investment rose to 17% more than the pre-pandemic level in the US, while only 8% higher in the UK, and over 8% lower in the Eurozone (Giles, 2025). Simultaneously, the effects of tighter monetary policy are more muted in the US than in Europe, partly due to differences in the mortgage market structure: the 2022 energy crisis had a larger impact in Europe, leading to weaker household balance sheets (Goldman Sachs, 2024).
Another reason for monetary policy divergence is the difference in fiscal policy and public debt levels, amplified by uncertain trade policy. US Federal Debt stands at 120% of GDP, compared to 95% in the UK, and 88% in the Euro Area. Bianchi, Faccini and Melosi (2023) attribute much of the recent inflationary surge in the US to US fiscal policy and Barro and Bianchi (2023) show that inflation differences across OECD countries can be attributed to public debt levels. Yet the gap between inflation protected-US and German bonds is roughly the same as that of the nominal bonds, indicating differences in real interest rates, not merely inflation expectations. Meanwhile, Trump’s economic policy changes may be amplifying the anticipated divergence. The US Congress is currently proposing tax cuts that aren’t fully funded by spending cuts, while Europe was running tighter budgetary policy (until the German budgetary announcement), and the UK intent on adhering to its fiscal rules. Additionally, Trump’s increased tariffs may cause a domestic supply shock, making it more difficult for the Fed to cut rates. In contrast, tighter fiscal policy, along with a potential demand shock coming from the tariffs would force looser monetary policy in Europe (Giles, 2025).
Question 1: Which of the differences are the main cause for the medium-term interest rate differential between the US and EU countries?
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Twenty-eight panelists responded to the question. The clear majority (over 60%) believes that differences in long-run growth prospects and the natural rate of interest are the main cause for the medium-term interest rate differential between the US and EU countries. Part of the majority also attribute part of the difference to inflation and/or fiscal policy. Overall, about a third of the panel believes that the divergence is caused by the differences in inflation expectations and a third of the members considers the cause to be differences in fiscal policy. Finally, a minority of almost 15% of the panel believes the differences in monetary policy stance to be the main cause, with another 15% attributing the divergence to differences in short-term growth.
Most panelists believe that the cause of the interest rate differences is the divergence of views on long-run growth. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré (Banque de France) says that: “The monetary policy stance affects interest rates up to 2-5 years. For 10 year yields (graph 1), the natural rate is key. It is determined not only by potential growth, but also by saving-investment imbalances (twin deficits both in the US and in the UK, contrasting with the euro area).”
Similarly, in his recent working paper, Ricardo Reis (LSE) argues that “r-star” depends on the approach used to measuring it. In his analysis of the recent past (2021-24), he finds that in the US, “the yield on government bonds has continuously and quickly risen since 2022” and, unlike the 1995-2019 period, the gap between that yield and the return on productive capital has fallen sharply. The policy rate moved upwards along with the trend of the investment-bond yield gap decreasing (Reis, 2025).
Some members of the panel offer separate causes for the premium on US and on UK debt. Franck Portier (University College London) explains: “I would attribute the bulk of medium-term interest rate differential between the US and EU countries to better growth prospects and higher natural real interest rate in the US.” However, he adds that: “That explanation would not work for the differential between UK and EU (no better growth prospects in the UK), where the differential is for me more likely to be caused by higher inflation expectations in the UK (related to post-Brexit adjustment).”
Finally, some members believe the effect to be driven by the differences in monetary policy stemming from varying fiscal policies. David Cobham (Heriot-Watt University) mentions that: “Long-standing differences in fiscal policy, which go back to the European 'debt brake' and misplaced fiscal consolidation measures, on the one hand, and to the US Congress's de facto Keynesianism (so different from the historic GOP) on the other, have driven differences in deficits, debt and growth, to which monetary policy has responded in predictable ways.”
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References
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Aliaga-Díaz, R. (2024, November 12). Fed cuts: How far matters more than how fast. Vanguard. https://www.nl.vanguard/professional/insights/market-commentary/fed-cuts-how-far-matters-more-than-how-fast
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Armstrong, R. E. (2025, January 29). Federal Reserve holds rates steady: Policy divergence with ECB widens. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/business/2025/01/29/federal-reserve-holds-rates-steady-policy-divergence-with-ecb-widens
Robert J. Barro & Francesco Bianchi, 2023. "Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2023," NBER Working Papers 31838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Bassi, F. (2024, December 19). Market Outlook 2025. J.P. Morgan. https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/global-research/outlook/market-outlook#section-header
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Francesco Bianchi, Renato Faccini, Leonardo Melosi, A Fiscal Theory of Persistent Inflation, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 138, Issue 4, November 2023, Pages 2127–2179, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjad027
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Giles, C. (2024, May 7). European interest rates are set to diverge from the US. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/f76884e9-bc66-4a5d-8445-4f842af5ef68
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Giles, C. (2025, February 6). Trump amplifies the transatlantic economic divergence. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/d8aaf83b-f307-4efe-b564-9309fe8ecf21
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Goldman Sachs. (2024, May 21). Central Bank Divergence: Room to Run? Goldman Sachs Research. https://www.goldmansachs.com/pdfs/insights/pages/gs-research/central-bank-divergence-room-to-run/report.pdf
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Gourinchas, P. (2025, January 17). As One Cycle Ends, Another Begins Amid Growing Divergence. International Monetary Fund (IMF). https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/01/17/as-one-cycle-ends-another-begins-amid-growing-divergence
IMF. (2023, April 11). World Economic Outlook, April 2023: A Rocky Recovery. International Monetary Fund (IMF). https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/04/11/world-economic-outlook-april-2023
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Koranyi, B., & Canepa, F. (2024, April 12). Why is European economy diverging from US and what are the limits to this? Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europes-economic-divergence-with-us-is-real-has-its-limits-2024-04-12/
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Koranyi, B., & Richardson, A. (2025, February 7). ECB still has several rate cuts to go before hitting 'neutral' level, paper finds. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/ecb-still-has-several-rate-cuts-go-before-hitting-neutral-level-paper-finds-2025-02-07/
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Partington, R. (2025, February 19). Bank of England faces bumpier road after inflation accelerates. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/feb/19/bank-of-england-faces-bumpier-road-after-inflation-accelerates
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Reis, R. (2025, January). The Four R-stars: From Interest Rates to Inflation and Back. https://personal.lse.ac.uk/reisr/papers/99-4rstars.pdf
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Sindreu, J. (2024, December 27). The Biggest Losers From High U.S. Rates Might Be Abroad. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/economy/central-banking/the-biggest-losers-from-high-u-s-rates-might-be-abroad-aa66eb3f
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Wilding, T., & Balls, A. (2024, April 3). Cyclical Outlook: Diverging Markets, Diversified Portfolios. PIMCO. https://www.pimco.com/eu/en/insights/diverging-markets-diversified-portfolios