The Economic and Market Impacts of the UK Budget
Ethan Ilzetzki and Marta Grzana
Monday, December 16, 2024
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Summary
The November 2024 CfM survey asked the members of its panel about the impact of the UK Autumn Budget and the market reaction to the budget. The panel unanimously attributed the rise in medium-term interest rates in the runup to and the aftermath of the budget. Yet it was evenly split on what fraction of the rise in interest rates was due to the budget. Moreover, the vast majority of the panel believes that the rise in employer national insurance contributions will have small or no impact on UK economic growth in the upcoming five years.
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Background
The November 2024 CfM survey asked the members of its panel for their reaction to two aspects of the UK Autumn Budget. The panellists were asked about their whether the increase in gilt yields in the second half of 2024 was due to the budget. They were also asked about the impact of the increase in employer national insurance contributions on UK economic growth.
UK Autumn Budget Reactions
The Labour government announced its Autumn Budget on October 30th. The Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) predicts that it will spur growth in the short term (next two years) and in the much longer term (ten to fifteen years) through infrastructure investment, with a slight dip in growth over the three to five year horizon. The National Insurance changes for employers will likely weigh down disposable income and hit private investment (Islam, 2024). On the other hand, the increase in public investment is likely to raise public capital stock and incentivise some private investment (OBR, 2024). Moreover, the forecasted growth is relatively small: perhaps disappointing relative to its costs of £70bn a year. The Budget also slows the pace of deficit reduction with borrowing projected to rise from £122bn last year to £127bn this year before falling back to £71bn in 2029-30 and net debt failing as a share of GDP from 98.4% to 97% by 2029-30 (OBR, 2024).
Overall, the budget announcement was followed by a moderately negative reaction in financial markets causing a rise in government bond yields and weakening the pound by around 0.8% against the dollar intraday (Hoggan & Islam, 2024). Bond yields increased by 0.25 percentage points in the week following the budget. Some have argued that the rising yields could be a result of the higher borrowing needed to fund the budget’s commitments as only £25bn of the additional tax revenue will materialise in the next fiscal year relative to the extra £60bn in spending over the same period (Smith, 2024). Moreover, some analysts attributed the rise in yields to the risk that the Bank of England will cut interest rates less than estimated in response to the budget (Schomberg & Milliken, 2024). Some fund managers also seem to think that the market reaction has more to do with the potential slower and fewer interest rate cuts coming from BoE due to higher inflation coming from the higher growth in the short-term, sparked by the budget (Johnson, 2024).
The market movements were about a tenth of those seen by the mini budget of Liz Truss. Moreover, the rise has occurred in the context of a wider global increase in borrowing costs, led by the US (Hoggan & Islam, 2024). Yield movements on budget day were part of a trend with 10-year gilt yields rising from 3.9% this summer to roughly 4.4% today: almost precisely the increase in 10-year US Treasury yields over the same 3 months. Regardless of the cause, higher borrowing rates also decrease the projected headroom for public investment. In the budget documentation, the OBR has said that the Reeves could afford to see these yields rise by about 1.3 percentage points. Crossing that threshold would eliminate the headroom against the fiscal rules (Conway, 2024).
According to the Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) forecasts, the budget measures will increase GDP by 0.75 percentage points and CPI by 0.5 pp in a one-year horizon. The budget has reinforced caution when it comes to the scope of further interest rate cuts. The MPC also predicts inflation running at 2.7% in Q4 of 2025 relative to the previously forecasted 2.2%. The MPC analysis reflects the budget measures which will take effect next year, such as the rise in a cap on bus fares, VAT on private schools, and the increase in vehicle excise duty. However, it is much more uncertain about the effects of the large business tax hike through changes to employers’ national insurance (Strauss & Fleming, 2024).
The change in National Insurance Contributions (NIC) for employers is one of the biggest single tax-raising measures in a historical perspective, predicted to raise around £25bn annually. Employers’ national insurance contributions were increased by 0.2 percentage points (to 15%) and the threshold at which employers start paying national insurance was lowered from to £5,000 from £9,100. This measure is expected to raise around £25bn per year - most of which will come from the lower threshold. But this may therefore cause a significant increase in the cost of employing lower paid workers (Thomas, 2024).
Yet, those changes may risk unequal side-effects: they will mostly affect low-income jobs in medium-sized corporations, mainly in the hospitality industry. In the first two weeks following the budget, more than 200 leaders from the hospitality industry signed a letter disapproving of the decision (Thomas, 2024). Morgan Stanley estimated that these changes would result in an overall 3% increase in staff costs for UK retailers. They predict that those costs, combined with increases in living wages would lead to an acceleration of food inflation (Speed et al., 2024). These tax rises are also partly reflected in the OBR’s downgraded projections for real household income growth over the next few years (Johnson, 2024). Therefore, some are calling the NIC changes a big gamble on whether the economy is in robust enough health to handle it (Islam, 2024). The overall effect will depend on the strength of customer demand and employees’ bargaining power (Strauss & Fleming, 2024).
Question 1: How much of the 20 basis point increase in 2-year gilt yields and the 30 basis point increase in 10-year gilt yields since the election can be attributed to the increase in borrowing in the Autumn Budget and the anticipation thereof?
Fifteen panel members responded to this question. The panel is unanimous that the increase in bond yields can be attributed to the budget. However, the panellists are evenly split on the share of the increase that can be attributed to the budget. Roughly half of the panel believes that the effect of the budget on the interest rate increase was minor. The other half of the panel believes that the budget caused the majority (over 25%) or the entire interest rate increase (20%).
Most panellists agree that the interest rate increase as a reaction to the budget was insubstantial. Some highlight that it was relatively small and a result of short-term speculation. Thomas Sampson (LSE) thinks that “The most important take-away is that the market reaction was unremarkable and very small compared to the aftermath of Liz Truss' mini-budget”. Paul De Grauwe (LSE) notes that: “On election date the 10-year gilt yield was 4.21; today it is 4.32. Almost no change”. He says that “there is a lot of short-term volatility that we do not understand and is usually the result of short-term speculation and herding behaviour”. Similarly, Angus Armstrong (UCL) comments that: ”Spreads on UK bonds (ten year) versus the US are back to where they were just before the budget and actually lower than say two months before the budget.” He adds that “the OBR's assessment that the increase in public investment in the budget leads to crowding out and no impact on productivity over the forecast period was a very particular take”.
Some panellists believe that the increase in gilt yields stems from market anticipation that the Bank of England will cut interest rates cuts more slowly due to the budget. James Smith (Resolution Foundation) believes that: “Bond yields rose mainly because financial-market participants anticipate that looser fiscal policy will mean tighter monetary policy”. He adds that “a more interesting comparison is with longer-dated forward rates which moved very little on the Budget itself (although a bit in the run up)”.
On the other hand, some panellists are more concerned about the effects of rising borrowing rates. Costas Milas (University of Liverpool) says that: “the Labour party has repeatedly stated that it needs 10 years to ‘rebuild’ the country”. He concludes that: “The bigger move in 10-year yields (compared to 2-year yields) is telling me that investors do not trust the (Budget) policies of the Labour party”. Roger Farmer (University of Warwick) shares this concern and assesses the UK budget policies relative to the US. He says that: “The comparison between the UK budget and the plans of the incoming US administration are stark. The US is embracing energy expansion -- the UK is pursuing net zero. The US is cutting taxes -- the UK is raising them”.
Question 2: How will increases in employer national insurance contributions affect UK economic growth over the upcoming five years?
panellists' responded to this question. The vast majority (over 70%) of the panel thinks that the increase in employer national insurance contributions will have small to no effect on UK economic growth over the next five years. Around 10% of panel goes as far as to predict that changes to employer contributions will have no effect at all. A minority believes that the increase in NIC will have large negative effects on growth in the upcoming five years.
Most panellists believe that most of the cost of the increase in employer national insurance contributions will be passed on to employees, yet it will have a minor effect on economic growth. Thomas Sampson (LSE) believes that: “raising employers' national insurance contributions was probably not the optimal choice”, but he doesn’t “expect it to be a major drag on the UK economy compared to the alternatives”. Angus Armstrong (UCL) agrees that the effect will be minor and says that: “Most of the cost of the NICS will eventually be passed to employees which may lead to a small fall in labour force participation, but we are dealing with one or two tenths of a percent”.
Other panellists put the rise in NICs in a wider context. David Cobham (Heriot-Watt University) believes that: “focusing only on the NICs rises is not helpful”. He adds that “we need an overall analysis which takes account of the spending increases, as well as the NICs increases”. Moreover, James Smith (Resolution Foundation) thinks that “the rise in the tax on jobs on its own will tend to slow growth” but may stimulate investment in other production methods that require less labor.
Finally, some members believe that the effect of the tax raise will be major. Roger Farmer (University of Warwick) comments: “To put this in context, the planned increase has already impacted Warwick University's budget plans for the coming year. Stellantis is closing its Luton plant. Buckle up -- it will be a bumpy ride”.
References
Conway, E. (2024, November 1). Budget: Hostile market response as chancellor suffers Halloween nightmare. Sky News. https://news.sky.com/story/markets-hostile-to-reevess-budget-but-were-not-in-crisis-territory-yet-13245638
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Hoggan, K., & Islam, F. (2024, October 31). Budget investors' reaction 'very different' to Liz Truss. BBC. Retrieved November 16, 2024, from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2n0eeep90o
Islam, F. (2024, October 30). UK economy: Where is the growth in this Budget? BBC. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cqj0vy1gr9yo
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Johnson, C. (2024, November 4). After the Budget, Where Next for UK Interest Rates? Morningstar. https://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/256839/after-the-budget-where-next-for-uk-interest-rates.aspx
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Johnson, P. (2024, October 30). Autumn Budget 2024: initial IFS response | Institute for Fiscal Studies. IFS. https://ifs.org.uk/articles/autumn-budget-2024-initial-ifs-response
OBR. (2024, October 30). Economic and fiscal outlook – October 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility. OBR. https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-october-2024/#chapter-1
Schomberg, W., & Milliken, D. (2024, November 5). UK bond yields hit one-year high on US election nerves. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/uk-bond-yields-hit-one-year-high-us-election-nerves-2024-11-05/
Smith, J. (2024, November 7). The UK's bond yield spike is reaching its limits. ING Think. https://think.ing.com/articles/the-uks-bond-yield-spike-is-reaching-its-limits/
Speed, M., Ring, S., & Pickard, J. (2024, November 10). Hospitality bosses warn Rachel Reeves' UK tax increases will lead to 'drastic' job cuts. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/1e54abab-346c-4e65-bd24-56db038233d1
Strauss, D., & Fleming, S. (2024, November 7). More growth, inflation and uncertainty: the BoE's Budget verdict. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/6d374703-a5f0-4050-b208-8f5bbaa363ba
Thomas, N. (2024, November 11). Budget fallout will hit UK plc's squeezed middle hardest. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/8a3cdc8c-83c7-4c18-8c2b-f462e15af286
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Tukker, M., & Smith, J. (2024, November 15). Rates: Three reasons 10Y gilt yields should revert below USTs, eventually. ING Think. https://think.ing.com/articles/rates-three-reasons-10y-gilt-yields-should-revert-below-usts-eventually/