A key achievement of the UK economic policy in the aftermath of the crisis has been the insulation of the country from the most damaging type of financial crisis---the loss of market confidence on “sovereign signature”. The UK was at the center of the financial storm in 2007-2009. The Bank of England intervened massively---showing markets its determination in guaranteeing orderly conditions in UK financial markets. The fall in the exchange rate made sure that all the increase in risk of UK denominated assets was reflected upfront in their price in international portfolios. In this context, the announcement (without the implementation) of tough fiscal measures had the consequence of further reassuring investors---while de facto automatic stabilizers were working and opening a large current account deficit. Words were tough, deeds were OK. The problem in the UK, like elsewhere, was that initially policymakers operated on expectations of a much shorter crisis. So talking (again just talking) tough measures two-three years down the line seemed reasonable. The crisis turned out to be much longer (alas, wishful ignorance, as, a part from the Japanese experience, Andre Meier at the IMF had already shown the type of macro outlook to expect). So over the years, government had the problem of maintaining promises that ex post were not appropriate. To put it simply. There is a unfinished, dangerous deleveraging process, which is particularly difficult in the Eurozone. The UK so far has surfed the crisis by enjoying inflow of physical and human capital. It is now facing the aftershock of a severe European slowdown. Cash-generating austerity measures are of no use in these circumstances. Rigorous fiscal policy needs to focus on sustainability, which is not only health care and pension but also infrastructure and services. On balance, it would have been useful to sustain some spending programme, with an eye on its medium to long-run effect.