Jorge Braga de Macedo's picture
Affiliation: 
Nova School of Business and Economics, Lisbon
Credentials: 
Emeritus Professor of Economics

Voting history

ECB Monetary Policy and Catch-up Inflation

Question 2: Which of the following policies is the most desirable to meet the ECBs objective to achieve its mandate of “price stability” as you understand this term.

Answer:
Average inflation targeting
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
While other policies targeting the "price level" or "nominal GDP" let alone a "hybrid" may be more appealing in theory this one is the least complicated to adjust to

Question 1: To what extent do you agree with the following statement? “The European Central Bank should systematically allow for inflation to exceed its target to compensate for periods of below target inflation.”

Answer:
Agree
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
As this remains a more controversial issue in the euro area than elsewhere I hesitated on whether I agree or strongly agree

Fiscal Rules in the European Monetary Union

Question 2: Which of the following is the one reform you would choose to improve fiscal rules?

Answer:
Fiscal councils or fiscal standards
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
It is not clear from the question what the "impact" variables (output, inflation, unemployment, inequality) would be at what horizon (quarter, fear, decade) and the complementarity between the alternatives to the existing fiscal rules should not be discarded. Nevertheless, my experience with the Maastricht treaty (which I signed on behalf of Portugal) and the effectiveness of the Fiscal Council created in 2012, at the time of the adjustment program agreed with the “troika”, suggest that enhancing the complementarity between fiscal councils and norms would avoid getting bogged down in the burocratic silos which have plagued EU fiscal rules.

Proposition 1: The existing fiscal rules for European Monetary Union members require revision.

Answer:
Agree
Confidence level:
Extremely confident
Comment:
Ever since fiscal rules were discussed in preparation to the 1991 intergovernmental conference their practical effectiveness has been disputed due to the very different budgetary procedures of member states and indeed the ones agreed at Maastricht were quickly revised in the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is therefore tempting to remain indifferent rather than strongly agreeing or disagreeing. Nevertheless, I agree with a revision because the link between fiscal and financial stability uncovered by the euro crisis of 2010-14 has become stronger in the subsequent environments, not least the pandemic.

The ECB’s Green Agenda

Question 2: Would you support changing the ECB’s mandate to incorporate the EU’s target of carbon neutrality by 2050, if such a change is deemed legally necessary to adopt your preferred approach?

Answer:
No
Confidence level:
Very confident
Comment:
the EU’s target of carbon neutrality by 2050 is part of an international effort where central banks are not at the forefront. in addition a change in the mandate of the ECB is much more difficult than that of a national central bank

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