There is certainly a serious risk to central bank independence around the world, partly because of the widened responsibilities of central banks during the crisis and also because of the rise of populist politics. In addition to the macro prudential and financial stability roles mentioned above, central banks have taken over new responsibilities in banking supervision and bank resolution. This has been the case for both BoE and the ECB. In Europe, the BRRD dictates that losses are imposed on private investors to protect the tax payer, by bailing in bondholders, shareholders and unprotected depositors. However, resolution actions by central banks that involved bail in have been fiercely attacked by politicians representing interest groups that suffered losses. Unfortunately, the independence of central banks has been eroded through political capture of central bank boards and other indirect actions by governments. If anything, central banks' widened roles require more, not less independence. If greater independence is not forthcoming, central banks should try to protect their existing levels of independence by going back to basics. Bank supervision, bank resolution and macro prudential policies can be left for other bodies, that will also need to be accountable and independent, but at least no one would be able to complain that central banks and their unelected governors have too much power.

I don't understand how they can say that with inflation so much lower than the 2% target. Would they be saying that monetary policy shouldn't be tight if inflation was near 4%?